When the Bishops issue statements on the morality of Vaccines, from what I have seen, they refer to two distinct components, though not explicitly. One component of the statement addresses the morality of the vaccine itself. The other part of the statements attempts to address the degree of cooperation in evil of the user/recipient of the vaccine. The first part is based upon the facts of production of the vaccine. The second part, that of the use of the vaccine, is a bit more complex.
The Church’s moral analysis regarding the use of the vaccine (the second component of the statements) is based upon what is called the Principle of Cooperation. The Church says that we should avoid cooperation in evil as much as possible according to reason. Let’s be clear that when we speak about the morality of cooperation, we are not speaking about the morality of the act of the principal moral agent (the one who commits the original act of sin). The cooperator is someone who does something before or after the act that could be used to benefit or assist the principal agent.
Take the simple case of Severius, a fellow who decides to rob a bank. Severius is the principal moral agent in the bank robbery, the perpetrator, but he has help. He asked a friend, Aquila, to pick him up at an address several blocks from the bank. Aquila does not know why he asked her for a ride or even that she is near a bank, she is just happy to help her friend. Aquila cooperates in Severius’s crime. But her cooperation is called remote because she does not intend the crime and she does not know that her actions are helping Severius flee a crime. This is true whether Severius steals a little or a lot, whether he uses a weapon or not, whether he robs 1 bank or many, or even whether he injures or kills someone in the process or not. Aquila’s actions are only remotely related to the crime.
Clearly, Aquila is not the criminal. In fact, she knows only that she did a good thing in helping her friend with a ride. However, if Aquila learned that she was used by the criminal to profit from his crimes, she would have a very different view of her own actions. If she knew beforehand why he needed a ride, she would not have gone to meet him and help him. Her cooperation in Severius’s crime is greater when she knows. If she knows why she is there, she could be responsible for the crime to a greater degree. Her cooperation would be greater.
Let us change the situation to reflect a bit more of the situation with these vaccines. This will be more complex. This is only for the purpose of analysis and not to minimize the evil of abortion or the problems with the vaccines. In this case, Severius has robbed a bank and killed three people in the process. He is never identified and uses the money to buy shares in a number of start-up tech companies, becoming enormously wealthy over the course of several decades. When he dies, he leaves all of his vast fortune to a Trust Fund set up for assisting children who need a special life-saving medical procedure. Numerous families benefit from this over the course of 40 years. Finally, though, it is determined that the origin of the funds for this Trust was partially from the original bank robbery many years ago. It is also learned that Severius was part of a large crime “family” and that many such robberies had taken place by persons within that group and among other organized crime syndicates. The Jones family has a baby daughter needing the life-saving procedure and can only obtain the procedure with a grant from the Trust Fund. Under the Principle of Cooperation, would the Jones’s be morally required to allow their child to die rather than take the money?
Let’s begin to analyze this. The original bank robbery and killings by Severius are clearly evil actions. Money originally invested by him which led to his wealth was a product of those evil actions and it seems that it is a part of much larger evil enterprise. That evil is serious and undeniable. The question here (following the analogy) is, however, Is the Jones family cooperating in that evil committed by Severius by using the money from the Trust fund. And, if so, is that cooperation immoral and therefore to be avoided completely? On the other hand, is the life-saving procedure for the baby daughter a sufficiently serious reason that allows the family to take the money even given its origin?
Most statements on the question of vaccines, seem to indicate that, by analogy, the Jones family would be, in some very remote way, cooperating in the original evil. They are not knowing cooperators in the original acts, but have become associated with it by the use of the funds. Is this immoral?
Understand that I am not meaning in any way to trivialize the evil of abortion. I am trying to illustrate the thought behind the Principle of Cooperation and help you understand it, even if you do not completely agree with the conclusions being made.
I will leave this here for your rumination. Don’t jump to any conclusions. I will continue this analysis in a future post.
